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ABSTRACT 
Beliefs are conventionally understood to guide people’s actions. Put another way, the 
actions which people take are understood to be products of what they believe. However, these 
claims are challenged by the fact that many Quakers hold that they do not have a creed. This 
feature of Quakerism creates a tension with the theory that actions must follow from beliefs. That 
tension prompts a question: How can Quakers make ethical decisions in a clear and decisive 
manner when they lack a creed? The answer to such a question is significant for two reasons. 
First, it provides insights into the specific case of Quakerism. Second, it brings about an 
important examination of the role which creeds play in the ethics of religions in general. Many 
variations of Quaker ethics resemble virtue ethics. This is not to say that Quakerism and the 
tradition of virtue ethics share a common origin, as they do not. Rather, the tendencies and 
values of many Quakers cause them to approach moral dilemmas in a manner which closely 
resembles that of virtue ethics. Accordingly, virtue ethics can be used as a tool with which one 
can understand, explain, and defend the ethical reasoning of many Quakers. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Beliefs are conventionally understood to guide people’s actions. Put another way, the 
actions which people take are understood to be products of what they believe. However, these 
claims are challenged by the fact that many Quakers hold that they do not have a creed. This 
feature of Quakerism creates a tension with the theory that actions must follow from beliefs. That 
tension prompts a question: How can Quakers make ethical decisions in a clear and decisive 
manner when they lack a creed? The answer to such a question is significant for two reasons. 
First, it provides insights into the specific case of Quakerism. Second, it brings about an 
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important examination of the role which creeds play in the ethics of religions in general. Many 
variations of Quaker ethics resemble virtue ethics. This is not to say that Quakerism and the 
tradition of virtue ethics share a common origin, as they do not. Rather, the tendencies and 
values of many Quakers cause them to approach moral dilemmas in a manner which closely 
resembles that of virtue ethics. Accordingly, virtue ethics can be used as a tool with which one 
can understand, explain, and defend the ethical reasoning of many Quakers. 
Since this project introduces its topic of investigation by looking at Quakerism’s lack of 
belief in a creed, it is vital that the term “belief” be described and that the term “creed” be 
defined. Lopez asserts that belief has, largely due to its centrality within Christian thought, 
become the primary standard by which practically all religious people are judged to be affiliates 
of their respective religions. Even those scholars who use the dimensions of both belief and 
practice to evaluate religions have tended to view practices as “deeds motivated by belief,” 
which maintains the view that belief is the thing at the root of all religions.1 In addition to this, 
Lopez mentions three important points. First, belief is the necessary foundation upon which 
theology is built; belief is not the result of reasoning and concept-formation as much as it is a 
starting point which must precede reasoning and concept-formation.2 Second, the beliefs which a 
person is inclined to agree with largely depend upon the cultural background and historical 
context in which they have lived.3 Third, beliefs often draw contrasts between different groups of 
people, since a belief is only a significant proposition if there are some people who do not agree 
                                                           
1 Donald S. Lopez, Jr., “Belief,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. 
Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998), 21. 
2 Ibid., 23-24. 
3 Ibid., 27-28. 
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with it.4 These understandings reveal the concept of belief to be complex and cast some doubt on 
its use as a stable academic tool. 
More recently, Jason M. Blum has provided his own assessment of belief as a term within 
the study of religions. While acknowledging that it is an idea which has its drawbacks, he asserts 
that a consideration of belief is still “unavoidable in the study of religion.”5 The presence of 
belief may not be sufficient to define a thing as a religion, but it is a necessary part of all 
religions. The universality of belief within every religion, even when it does not play a major 
role, can be attributed, Blum writes, to the fact that belief is an inherent feature of being human. 
Since the difficult category of belief cannot be abandoned by scholars of religion, Blum argues, 
the proper solution is to take more nuanced, detailed, and sophisticated approaches to the concept 
of belief. This would include distinguishing different subcategories of belief from each other, 
taking scholarly biases into account, and utilizing careful methodologies.6 
With belief explained, it is time to define the concept of creeds. The Nicene Creed will be 
used as the paradigmatic example. It is an explicitly-worded declaration. Parsenios argues that 
the Creed’s specific structure mirrors that of the Bible; just as the Bible begins with the world’s 
creation “and ends with the expectation of a new creation,” the Creed begins by designating God 
as the Creator and ends by anticipating a great resurrection and a new age.7 Several of its 
passages accentuate the differences between those who recite it and those who hold opposing 
beliefs. The statement of belief “in One God” establishes a continuity with Judaism while 
                                                           
4 Ibid., 33-34. 
5 Jason N. Blum, “Belief: Problems and Pseudo-Problems,” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 86, no.3 (2018), 643, doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfy001. 
6 Ibid., 660-661. 
7 George L. Parsenios, “The Creed: The Symbol of the Faith,” Theology Today 67, 
(2011), 394, doi:10.1177/004057361106700402. 
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creating a contrast with polytheists.8 The statement that God is the “Maker of heaven and earth, 
and of all things visible and invisible” establishes God’s status while creating a contrast with the 
Gnostics.9 The statement that there is “one Lord, Jesus Christ” establishes Christ’s status while 
creating a contrast with the theology of Arius.10 In these ways, the Nicene Creed differentiates 
those who believe in it from adherents of neighboring belief-systems. 
But the Creed does more than this. It takes positions on the relationship between God and 
Christ, legitimizes Christ further, explains the nature of the Trinity, and introduces the Holy 
Spirit as something which is also worthy of worship. But, in addition to these doctrinal points, 
the Creed makes claims about the Christian community. Members of this community of belief, 
according to the Nicene Creed, should be members of the church. They should also, expecting “a 
new creation,” “look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the age to come.”11 Even 
more than all of this, the Creed is a marker of identity which true believers can use, like a 
soldier’s insignia, to distinguish their fellows from others. It is also a way of life. “One needs to 
live the Creed,” meaning that they must live by the “laws and standards” of Christ, rather than 
the norms followed by the rest of this world.12 Taking the Nicene Creed as the archetypical 
creed, one should understand creeds to be explicit statements of belief which provide positions 
on matters of doctrine and instruct believers in how they ought to live their lives. 
Having covered these essential definitions, it is now appropriate to describe the sort of 
methodology which will be used in this project. It will follow the methodological suggestions of 
Bruce Lincoln in two notable ways, but it will diverge from this in one way. This project will 
                                                           
8 Ibid., 395. 
9 Ibid., 396. 
10 Ibid., 397. 
11 Ibid., 399-403. 
12 Ibid., 403-404. 
5 
 
study the topic of religion through the perspective of history, attempting to examine things which 
“represent themselves as eternal, transcendent, spiritual, and divine” through the use of “rigorous 
critical practice.”13 Similarly, this project will approach religious texts as human-made, treating 
what is written within these texts as claims to the truth rather than definite expressions of 
absolute truth.14 However, it will not share Lincoln’s focus on “material issues” and the matters 
of social power which may have influenced religious developments.15 Instead, it will focus on 
the development and articulation of ideas in and of themselves. 
 
VIRTUE ETHICS 
Due to the objective of this study, it is necessary that a working definition of virtue ethics 
as a concept be provided. There are many traits which, when overlapping, constitute virtue 
ethics. The conceptual definition will, accordingly, be based on a composite of these traits. 
Virtue ethics stands in contrast to ethical systems proposing rules, commands, or duties. 
The Ten Commandments provide an example of the latter, as they are meant to be obligatory 
rules of conduct given to human beings by God. Kant also put forward an ethical system based 
on firm laws, but he asserted that these moral obligations were derived from human reason. 
Utilitarians, similarly, promote an obligation for people to do whatever maximizes happiness. In 
all such cases, individuals are expected to obey the rules or laws put forward.16 When one 
adheres to such an ethical system of duty, they will attempt to resolve moral dilemmas which 
                                                           
13 Bruce Lincoln, Gods and Demons, Priests and Scholars: Critical Explorations in the 
History of Religions (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2012), 1. 
14 Ibid., 5. 
15 Ibid., 9-10. 
16 Stan van Hooft, Understanding Virtue Ethics (Chesham, UK: Acumen Publishing 
Limited, 2006), 16. 
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they find themselves in by consulting the principles which they believe to be appropriate. A 
follower of virtue ethics, however, would disagree with such an approach.17 
Rather than emphasizing external norms to act upon, virtue ethicists pick their actions 
based on matters of character. How to act becomes a question of what kind of person one wants 
to be. In many cases, one who has not yet cultivated their character may act in ways which allow 
their character to develop in a positive manner. Once one has reached a maturity of character, 
they are expected to be taking virtuous action not to be virtuous but because the virtuous act is in 
accordance with how they intrinsically wish to act. Accordingly, while the ethics of duty are 
invested in judging acts as right or wrong, the ethics of virtue focus less on the propriety of acts 
themselves and more on what each act says about the character of the person doing it. The 
primary emphasis, therefore, is on the morality and character of persons; their actions are 
understood to be symptoms or secondary reflections of that character. It should be noted that 
character is something which takes shape due to habit or training, making it something which can 
be molded with sustained effort.18 
Virtue ethicists draw on a variety of virtues and vices when assessing an individual’s 
character. Different people have come up within different lists of virtues, and what ought to 
count as a virtue varies, at least in some cases, between cultures. Virtues have included such 
things as courage, justice, politeness, fidelity, compassion, mercy, and wisdom, in addition to 
many others. Some thinkers have theorized that there are certain general virtues which can be 
divided into more specific variations of virtue or that there exists a core of universal virtues 
which different cultures have expressed in different ways.19 Many virtue ethicists see vice as the 
                                                           
17 Ibid., 10-11. 
18 Ibid., 11-13. 
19 Ibid., 129-133. 
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inverse of a given virtue. For examples, when one fails to demonstrate the virtue of integrity, the 
result would be something such as deviousness, deceitfulness, or pretentiousness. These things 
would count as vices because they are antithetical to integrity.20 Similarly, cowardice would be 
considered a vice because it is a failure of courage. Aristotle, however, would add that rashness 
is also a failure of courage.21 This is because, to Aristotle, virtue was a desirable mean situated 
between two undesirable extremes: one of deficiency and the other of excess.22 
Systems of virtue tend to rely on some degree of role modeling or mentoring. In ancient 
Greece, for example, athletes competing in sporting events were reenacting the virtues of heroic 
figures. This would provide a concrete example of virtue, helping the spectators of these events 
to gain a better understanding of what virtue is.23 The poems and pieces of artwork 
commemorating such athletes did not celebrate the individual competitors as much as they 
celebrated the virtuous ideals which these competitors represented.24 A modern iteration of virtue 
ethics has drawn on Lev Vygotsky’s psychological work to argue that the virtues are best 
instilled through mentors. Those wishing to embody virtue are, therefore, encouraged to make 
themselves apprentices to virtuous role models and go about their ethical training within a social 
community.25 
While some ethical systems assert universalistic rules or duties, virtue ethics is staunchly 
particularistic. This is to say that, rather than holding all people to the same standards of conduct 
                                                           
20 Ibid., 167-168. 
21 Ibid., 141. 
22 Ibid., 59. 
23 Heather Reid, “Athletes as Heroes and Role Models: An Ancient Model,” Sports, 
Ethics and Philosophy 11, no. 1 (2017), 43-44, doi:10.1080/17511321.2016.1261931. 
24 Ibid., 48. 
25 Nico J. Gronum, “A Return to Virtue Ethics: Virtue Ethics, Cognitive Science and 
Character Education,” Verbum et Ecclesia 36, no. 1 (2015), 5, ProQuest document ID: 
1737513896. 
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at all times, it applies different standards to different people based on their respective 
circumstances and the specific circumstances which they are facing. For example, a shy person 
handling a situation which requires them to overcome their shyness could be considered 
courageous, whereas a person who is not shy handling the same situation would not be 
exercising any notable effort and therefore would not be demonstrating courage.26 To take a 
more severe example, virtue ethics avoids referring to abstractions, such as a “reverence for life,” 
preferring, instead, to examine particular living things.27 And, when a person is determining how 
to treat a fellow human being in a certain situation, virtue ethics pushes that person to consider 
the other’s specific condition.28 The particularistic nature of virtue ethics is especially apparent in 
Aristotle’s approach, since he believed that the desirable mean can only be determined by 
considering the condition of the actor and the nature of the situation which they are 
confronting.29 While the relatively abstract virtues may serve as general guides, specific things in 
the world and their particular features become the focus when a problem or dilemma arises. 
The description of virtue ethics which has been given shows how difficult it would be to 
come up with a real definition for virtue ethics. The truth is that it is an ethical system with many 
variations, these variations having only general commonalities between them. Because of this, 
virtue ethics is best identified as a Wittgensteinian family-resemblance concept. This is to say 
that the variations of virtue ethics have various points of “overlap” and that these overlapping 
features are like “many fibres” which connect to one another to produce a cohesive “thread” 
                                                           
26 Van Hooft, Virtue Ethics, 46. 
27 Ibid., 156. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 59. 
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running through all forms of the concept.30 Specifically, given the above description, systems of 
virtue ethics appear to be defined by six core traits: an opposition to commands or laws from 
authority, an emphasis on character over actions, an emphasis on habit as something which 
shapes character, a belief in a set of virtues and vices by which to assess character, a belief that 
virtues can be instilled in people through role models, and a strong inclination toward 
particularistic decision-making.31 
Norms of conduct containing many of or all of these traits can be designated as systems 
of virtue ethics or systems closely resembling virtue ethics. Meanwhile, those systems endorsing 
a small amount of or none of these traits can be said to not resemble virtue ethics to a meaningful 
degree. Based on such a framework, this study will investigate Quietist, Liberal, Conservative, 
and Evangelical variations of Quakerism to see how well they match up with the conceptual 
definition provided. 
 
QUIETIST QUAKERS 
Quietist Quakerism is the first branch of the religion which will be analyzed. As will be 
explained, it is older than the other branches being examined, and a considerable degree of its 
intellectual influence has affected more contemporary denominations. These facts make it a 
natural starting point. 
                                                           
30 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1958), 32. 
31 This particular description of virtue ethics is my own. I have heard of and read about 
many definitions of virtue ethics, and these definitions often vary greatly. To resolve this, I have 
defined virtue ethics as a family-resemblance term, based on the common attributes which 
definitions of it tend to share. This strikes me as the fairest way to represent virtue ethics. 
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A Guide to True Peace: Or, the Excellency of Inward and Spiritual Prayer will be the 
example of Quietist Quaker thinking examined in the search for meaningful overlaps between 
Quakerism and virtue ethics. This document is significant in and of itself, but it is also notable 
for its influence on Quakers who were born long after its initial publication. Many of its passages 
bear similarities to a virtue ethicist’s focus on habits and virtues. It also, though perhaps to a 
lesser degree, directs readers toward a particular role model and an emphasis on character. 
It is important that the context of this document be understood. The text was produced in 
1813 by two British Quakers and presents a form of prayer which eschews conscious exertions in 
favor of a contemplative approach. The Quaker community did not have any ordained clergy, nor 
did it have any monastics. Due to the absence of such an institutional hierarchy, there were no 
spiritual elites within the community for this text to be produced for; rather, it was made for all 
Quakers to understand.32 At the time that it was published, Quakers were nearing the end of a 
long period of isolation from other religious groups. The ideas which it expresses are derived 
from the Continental Quietism movement: a decentralized group which advocated for an unusual 
and unorthodox kind of religious practice. Quietists believed that one ought to make themselves 
as receptive as possible to God, doing so by emptying themselves of their own thoughts and 
volitions. By letting go of their own wills and, in some cases, their desires for salvation, 
practitioners sought to obtain or experience a perfect connection with God.33 
The apophatic sort of prayer which A Guide to True Peace describes is based on a 
concept of praying without content. This unconventional idea stems from the belief that human 
                                                           
32 Michael Birkel, “Quaker Silent Prayer: A Guide to True Peace,” in Contemplative 
Literature: A Comparative Sourcebook on Meditation and Contemplative Prayer, ed. Louis 
Komjathy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015), 145. 
33 Ibid., 147. 
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beings tend to imagine God differently than how God truly is. When, however, people empty 
their minds of distractions and cease to imagine an approximation of God, doing so creates a 
vacuum which is filled by the true presence of God. This form of prayer is meant to be 
practicable by all people, and it can be enacted in any situation. The most thorough results, 
however, are found when one can take the time to focus their attention single-mindedly on peace, 
silence, and God’s presence. The surrender, submission, and self-annihilation which this text 
prescribes is not meant to destroy or kill the practitioner but, rather, is meant to maximize their 
receptivity to God’s influence.34 
This contentless prayer can be concentrated to a fine point of intense practice, but it can 
also function as an ever-present state of existence which accompanies a person at all times. The 
usefulness of such practice arises from Quietism’s understanding of human nature. Since the 
Quietists saw human beings as both apart from God and inclined towards sinfulness, they 
believed that it was best for people to annihilate their individual wills and replace them with the 
will of God. Such a union with God, they believed, was both desirable and possible.35 
Examining the text itself, one can see that it places heavy emphasis on the development 
of good habits. It explains that, since the minds of human beings are accustomed to “roving 
hither and thither,” it is very difficult to break this way of thinking and prevent the mind “from 
those wanderings which are an impediment to prayer.”36 To attempt alone such a breaking and 
reforming of one’s mental habits is futile, and doing so only serves to teach a person the degree 
                                                           
34 Ibid., 152-153. 
35 Ibid., 153. 
36 Anonymous, “A Guide to True Peace: Or, the Excellency of Inward and Spiritual 
Prayer,” in Contemplative Literature: A Comparative Sourcebook on Meditation and 
Contemplative Prayer, ed. Louis Komjathy (Albany, NY: State University of New Yok Press, 
2015), 178. 
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to which they are dependent on a higher power. Only God can give a person the silence which 
they desire.37 While God serves this therapeutic and purifying purpose, part of God’s process of 
refinement includes putting obstacles in front of a person for them to overcome. Even those who 
yield themselves to God are beset by distracting thoughts which prompt them to think that they 
“labour to no purpose.”38 This process serves to instill humility and prevent complacency. 
Furthermore, by being patient and persevering through such a process, practitioners will find that 
their “souls will be internally improved.”39 In these ways, it is a process which can be compared 
to “wrestling” with God, as Jacob did.40 Much as in that Biblical scene, one must continuously 
struggle until God concludes the struggle by granting a blessing. Over time, this practice leads 
the powers of God to help a person to overcome their challenges, as well as alter the 
practitioner’s desires for the best.41 
The habit of entering contemplative closeness to God grows in strength the more that it is 
practiced, just as any habit would. This “inward silence” is meant to turn a person away from the 
bodily senses and toward God.42 The closer to God one becomes, in this way, the further they 
become from their human passions. Such a movement away from sin and material objects 
ingrains itself in a “habitual” way, which solidifies this closeness to God and inward-facing 
state.43 As the text explains, all of this functions like a ship at sea. The further a ship moves away 
from land and away from its harbor, the less effort is needed to make it continue to move. At a 
certain point, the ship’s oar is no longer needed, and the one piloting the ship can keep the ship 
                                                           
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.,180. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 181. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 187. 
43 Ibid. 
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sailing with relatively little exertion. Such a vessel is smoothly guided by the wind, just as a 
mind which has attained this state is smoothly directed by God. Eventually, the ship is able to 
move swiftly without any effort by the crew, and any effort on their parts at this point would 
only slow its progress. Such a way of life, one which is reliant on “divine influence” instead of 
“reiterated acts of self-exertion,” is what the text calls for.44 But reaching that level, as shown, 
only comes after one has the right habits. 
The text’s other major similarity with virtue ethics is the attention which it pays to 
virtues. It squarely designates God as the source of all forms of virtue and claims that one will 
gain in the virtues in direct proportion to how much one immerses themselves in God. Virtues 
are “but as a mask” and comparable to articles of clothing, unless they “spring up from this 
divine source.”45 Explained in another way, love for God is the virtue which “will produce in us 
all other virtues.”46 Those things which come from the outward world stand in opposition to this 
inner virtue, and the former could be equated with vices if understood in the terms of virtue 
ethics.47 
Much of virtue’s centrality to this text is due to how it appears to be strongly linked with 
habit. It is, after all, the gradual alterations in a person which make them increasingly receptive 
to what God hopes to do. Once this process has proceeded far enough, a point is reached at 
which “the most ordinary and seemingly indifferent actions will become exercises of virtue.”48 
There seems to be, here, an implicit tying-together of the two concepts. The right habits enable 
                                                           
44 Ibid., 192. 
45 Ibid., 188. 
46 Ibid., 194. 
47 Ibid., 188-189. 
48 Ibid., 194. 
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one to cross a threshold at which opportunities for virtue greatly increase, while this increase in 
virtuous opportunities brings greater significance to everyday habits. 
The text also relates, though to a lesser degree, to matters of character and role modeling. 
Some attention is given to the human soul and God’s ability to refine it, which can easily be seen 
as an emphasis on character.49 On the matter of role modeling, Christ is very clearly presented as 
a role model; one is encouraged to follow and mirror the life of Jesus by taking up a 
metaphorical cross.50 Meanwhile, God, as the one who polishes people’s souls and reveals to 
people their flaws, is described as a sort of positive beacon or anchoring point which one ought 
to stay near to.51 
A Guide to True Peace is immensely important within the Quaker tradition as whole, 
especially since it has connected with multiple eras and branches of Quakerism. Reaching back 
to the very early days of the community, this text had much in common with the thinking of 
George Fox. He, too, had supported an apophatic method of prayer.52 It has also reached forward 
to impact contemporary Quakerism. Liberal Quakers, though at odds with its negative view of 
human nature, continue to read A Guide to True Peace. Conservative Quakers appear to see it 
still as a very useful guide to spiritual practice. Evangelical Quakers have, in recent years, taken 
a greater interest in this document and used it as a guide for meditative and contemplative 
practices.53 A Guide to True Peace has never found itself as part of Quakerism’s canon, since the 
Quakers do not see anything other than the Bible as officially canonical. The text has also 
remained less popular than such Quaker classics as George Fox’s Journal and Robert Barclay’s 
                                                           
49 Ibid., 189. 
50 Ibid., 186. 
51 Ibid., 183-184. 
52 Birkel, “Quaker Silent Prayer,” 154. 
53 Ibid., 165-166. 
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Apology. Still, it has had a major influence on Quaker spiritual practices throughout the 
denomination’s history.54 
In summary, Quietist Quakerism appears to be in accord with virtue ethics. It places a 
heavy emphasis on the interrelated matters of habit and virtue. Additionally, it contains smaller 
points of emphasis on character and role modeling. With that form of the Quaker tradition 
examined, this study will move on to three contemporary denominations of Quakerism. 
 
LIBERAL QUAKERS 
During the time between the era of George Fox and the present day, historical and 
cultural developments have altered original Quakerism in a variety of ways. In no case is this 
more apparent than in that of Liberal Quakerism. The Liberal branch of the Quaker movement 
was defined by a series of developments during the twentieth century, which included 
estrangement from fundamentalist Quakers, interactions with social movements, and responses 
to major controversies. It has embraced intellectualism, attempting to reconcile the faith with the 
findings of historical inquiry and modern science. This has led many Liberals to interpret 
religious truths as symbolic rather than absolute.55 
Much of Liberal Quakerism has been based on a rediscovering or reaffirming of ideas 
which had driven early Quakerism. Liberals, for example, came to place a heavy emphasis on 
creating positive social change while denigrating anti-egalitarian ideas, such as predestination. 
They also looked back at the history of the movement to find such figures as Fox, Penington, 
                                                           
54 Ibid., 151. 
55 William J. Frost, “Modernist and Liberal Quakers, 1887-2010,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Quaker Studies, ed. Stephen W. Angell and Pink Dandelion (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 78-79. 
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Margaret Fell, and William Penn as examples of key traits: unmediated religious experience, 
female empowerment, freedom of religion, and political involvement. Liberals built much of 
their conception of Quakerism on the idea of the “Light Within,” the belief that God created all 
people with a connection to the divine, and they saw all of life’s activities as touched by and 
tying into God.56 
Liberation theology found fertile ground in Liberal Quakerism, prompting support for 
draft-resisters, undocumented immigrants, and the poor. Women also embraced liberation 
theology, using it to push what had become a status of theoretical equality within Quaker 
institutions to one of actual equality. Universalism also took some root in Liberal Quakerism, 
which has led some Liberal Quakers to see all religious traditions as at least partially true and 
potentially connected to the “Light Within.”57 Those who have embraced Universalism maintain 
such core practices as silent worship while also seeking to borrow teachings from Buddhists, 
Hindus, Muslims, and Native Americans.58 
In the present day, Liberal Quakers are mostly white and educated, and there exists an 
increasing number who fall outside the traditional religious norm by being divorced, gay, or 
lesbian. Their institutions have become more democratic, with many coming to support human 
consensus over divine guidance. They have also become more inclusive, with some identifying 
themselves as non-Christian or even atheist while retaining their identities as Quakers. Matters of 
peace and environmentalism are often emphasized, while matters of societal vice are generally 
ignored. Proper behavior has become more important than proper belief. Despite major changes 
                                                           
56 Ibid., 80-81. 
57 Ibid., 88. 
58 Ibid. 
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such as these, Liberal Quakers have retained their emphasis on silence and spontaneity during 
meetings. Their meeting style remains unprogrammed.59 
“Virtuous Friends: Morality and Quaker Identity,” by Jackie Leach Scully, examines the 
morality used by Liberal Quakers in Britain. The system of ethics which this contemporary 
community appears to prefer is one of virtue ethics. Such an evaluation is the result of a study of 
the Britain Yearly Meeting from 1995 to 1997. Though Scully’s research project had focused on 
how these Liberal Quakers were responding to “advances in gene technology” and the 
consequent “genetic ethical dilemmas,” it reveals much about Quaker ethical deliberation in 
general.60 An examination of Scully’s article reveals that the resemblance to virtue ethics is 
largely a product of issues relating to rule-following and particularistic reasoning, with such 
matters as character and virtue also playing roles. 
One of the surprising discoveries of that study was the overall aversion of these Liberal 
Quakers to rule-based or duty-based systems of ethics. Scully’s contention is that most religious 
groups structure their moral thinking on a deontological foundation, basing their ideas of what 
constitutes proper behavior on what they believe to be divine commands. While Scully had 
expected the Quakers being studied to also express such a deontological leaning, this turned out 
not to be the case.61 This general aversion to deontology can be attributed to their “rejection of 
written creeds.”62 Since all Quakers, but especially Liberal Quakers, see “primary authority” as 
something which stems from “personal experience,” they prefer not to adhere to a framework 
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which puts rules and obligations over their personal convictions.63 It should be noted that this 
individual authority arising from one’s “personal experience of the Light” can even override 
scripture and “Quaker precedent.”64 The aversion of Liberal Quakers to utilitarianism, that 
ethical school which advocates for the greatest good for the most people, is based more on social 
reasons. First, having rejected voting as a means of making decisions, they are naturally 
unsympathetic to majoritarianism. Second, as people who emphasize social justice, they distrust 
any system which is prone to marginalize minorities in its pursuit of the highest quantitative 
value.65 Despite these overarching trends, it is important to recognize the fact that Quakers have 
a single deontological tenet at the core of their beliefs. This is the claim made by George Fox 
that there exists “that of God in everyone.”66 
Similarly, Liberal Quakerism places a heavy focus on particularistic, rather than 
universalistic, moral reasoning. This can be seen in what Scully terms their “moral collage,” 
which is their tendency to eschew ethical arguments which are “theoretically consistent.”67 Such 
a lack of internal coherence is not an indication of intellectual shortcoming. Rather, it is a 
consequence of priorities. Liberal Quakers simply do not put a high priority on this sort of 
consistency. Instead, they prioritize clear articulation of what people perceive and how they 
understand the issues at hand. It is by clearly expressing their ideas to each other, they believe, 
that participants in a dialogue can work toward a constructive conclusion. Additionally, Scully 
suggests that those who employ more than one ethical school at the same time may be doing so 
due to an understanding that a single ethical school is insufficient when a person is attempting to 
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solve actual problems.68 Liberal Quakers also practice a kind of particularistic reasoning which is 
closely in line with advice one might expect of a virtue ethicist. This is the Quaker focus on 
discernment, which is a close parallel to the idea of phronesis in virtue ethics. Both of these 
concepts indicate the need for individuals to use experience and wisdom in determining how to 
best act in real situations.69 
As implied, Liberal Quakers have studied and accepted the legitimacy of many ethical 
schools. Scully argues that those who were participating in moral deliberations were probably 
not consciously drawing on different schools. Instead, citing moral psychology, cognitive 
science, and other research, Scully asserts that they, much as a secular group would, formed 
general intuitions which they then expressed through and supported by arguments. It was not that 
they came to these dialogues with these ethical schools in mind. Rather, the discussions and 
debates over real-life moral controversies led them to take approaches which resembled the 
typical reasoning of certain ethical schools. The moral thinking of Liberal Quakers, however, 
does not resemble all ethical schools equally. Utilitarian arguments, for example, were rare, and 
arguments resembling contractarianism were not to be found. While positions which resembled 
forms of consequentialism other than utilitarianism made a strong showing, it was arguments 
closely paralleling virtue ethics which “turned up repeatedly.”70 From this, it appears that, while 
Liberal Quakers are not explicitly trained, instructed, or educated to think in the terms of virtue 
ethics, their values as a community lead them to take positions which are very close to or 
identical with what a virtue ethicist would say. 
                                                           
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 116. 
70 Ibid., 111. 
20 
 
Ethical approaches of Liberal Quakers also demonstrate other points of resemblance with 
virtue ethics by emphasizing character and virtue. The matter of character is very 
straightforward. Those who practice virtue ethics decide on which decisions to make by asking 
themselves what sort of character they have or want to have, leading to a system in which one’s 
actions are considered morally significant due to how they express an “agent’s interior moral 
nature.”71 Similarly, those who identify themselves as Quakers are likely to view themselves as 
such because of what they do more than what they believe. One can see, here, a common strand 
of actions being a reflection of character. This leads into the matter of virtues and testimonies. 
Quaker testimonies can basically be viewed as guidelines which one should consult when going 
about one’s life. There are testimonies for such things as “peace,” “justice,” “equality,” and 
integrity.”72 Though conceptually different from the virtues of virtue ethics, there are many 
testimonies which stand in parallel to particular virtues and other testimonies which can be 
understood as ways of enacting particular virtues.73 
Summarizing these points, Liberal Quakerism is strongly aligned with virtue ethics. In 
nearly all cases, Liberal Quakers tend to avoid moral reasoning which relies on absolute rules 
and duties. They heavily emphasize particularistic thinking in a way which closely resembles the 
phronesis of virtue ethics, as well as the matter of internal character in much the same way that 
virtue ethicists would. And, though not an exact match at a metaphysical level, the testimonies 
affect Liberal Quakers in a way which is functionally equivalent to how the virtues guide 
students of virtue ethics. 
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CONSERVATIVE QUAKERS 
Conservative Quakerism is another branch of the movement which has survived into the 
present day. However, whereas Liberals have been influenced by the events and norms of the 
outside world, Conservatives are most distinct for their especially persistent commitments to 
Quaker tradition and greater resistance to outside influences.74 Quaker Conservatives have 
placed a heavy emphasis on retaining their distinctness, and at one point they were set on 
keeping a “hedge” between themselves and those who practice other religions.75 It should be 
noted, however, that Conservative Quakers of the North Carolina Yearly Meeting were and still 
are more ecumenical than those of other Conservative Yearly Meetings. It should also be noted 
that Conservative Quakers have, historically, avoided involvement in national politics except to 
make statements of principles and that Quaker Conservatives are not necessarily political 
conservatives.76 
The twentieth century saw the numbers of Conservative Quakers drop substantially; only 
three of their Yearly Meetings remain. These Yearly Meetings in Ohio, Iowa, and North Carolina 
have had to begin affiliating with various Monthly Meetings, as a matter of survival. Despite 
these low numbers, Conservative Quakerism has been valued for the unique form of Christianity 
which it presents. They have, for example, embraced listening as a way of life, allowing them to 
be more in tune with the “Inward Christ.”77 Despite their continued distinctness, the loosening of 
the ideological “hedge” dividing them from others has allowed for greater cooperation with other 
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Quaker groups.78 Today, the defining feature of Conservative Quakerism is the guidance of God 
Himself in the lives of all believers.79 
Where Christ Presides: A Quaker Perspective on Moral Discernment presents a very 
strong example of virtue ethics in Quakerism. The book’s back cover indicates that its author, 
Jack Ciancio, is part of the Ararat Friends Meeting and serves on the North Carolina Yearly 
Meeting’s Peace and Social Concerns Committee. The Ararat Friends Meeting was a part of the 
North Carolina Yearly Meeting when the former was formed in 1924. Since 2017, following 
restructuring within the North Carolina Yearly Meeting, the Ararat Friends Meeting decided “to 
become a charter member of the North Carolina Fellowship of Friends,” a status which allows 
for greater autonomy.80 Ciancio’s book, published in 2009 according to its copyright page, would 
have been written prior to this reorganizing. In it, he makes many statements which parallel ideas 
found in virtue ethics. To adequately cover the many points he makes, this study will begin with 
what Ciancio has to say concerning rules and authority. From there, it will show how his position 
on rules and authority flows into his presentation of Jesus Christ as a role model. After that, it 
will explain his connection of Jesus Christ to character. 
Ciancio bases much of his thinking on Kohlberg’s concept of moral stages. Lawrence 
Kohlberg, who was a developmental psychologist, came up with a theory that human beings 
progress through a sequence of stages of moral development. Ciancio argues that, despite 
criticisms that this theory is culturally-biased and that Kohlberg only observed male test subjects, 
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it can serve as an effective model.81 Stages one, two, and three in this theory can be explained, 
respectively, as avoiding unwanted consequences for oneself, as doing things because they will 
hopefully benefit oneself, and as acting in such a way that doing so will bring oneself into 
conformity with a given group. Ciancio summarizes these three early stages and makes brief 
criticisms of them.82 
He is mostly concerned with stages four, five, and six. Stage four, the “legalistic” stage, 
is based on a “strict, literal adherence to, and interpretation of, the law.”83 Under such a system, 
“whatever the existing law, custom, or authority says is good,” while those who break the law 
are expected to face punishment.84 “Only a small percentage of adults advance beyond this 
stage,” Ciancio writes, and he sees such a method of thinking as responsible for leading many 
people astray.85 It is contrasted with moral stages five and six. The fifth stage leads a person to 
act in a way which “transcends common law-and-order reasoning” and eschews retribution.86 It 
is ideal, however, for people to move beyond this and embrace the sixth stage, in which 
decisions are made “based on the equality and worth of all individuals.”87 
Ciancio’s in-depth evaluation of stage four is strongly negative. He argues that such an 
authority-based style of thinking has, historically, enabled normal people to accept Nazism, 
Crusades against Muslim peoples, race-based slavery, and the genocides against Native 
Americans.88 He later says that it is in the nature of the fourth stage to enable the group think 
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which characterizes the third stage, offering this as an explanation of why modern United States 
history has seen such wide-spread support for the wars in Vietnam and Iraq.89 
In his evaluation of stage six, however, he describes it as the way of Christ, and here one 
can see the application of his view of Christ as a role model. Jesus Christ, Ciancio writes, 
“perfectly displayed” the “ultimate moral rightness” that is characteristic of stage six.90 Ciancio 
takes the Beatitudes, in particular, to be an indication of Christ’s alignment with stage-six 
thinking, and he takes the conflict between Christ and the Pharisees to be a clash between stage 
six and stage four.91 It is his contention that the Old Testament in general follows the morality of 
stage four and those stages below it, while “the morality of Christ in the New Testament is well 
beyond that stage.”92 
But the situation runs deeper than this. Ciancio states, very early on in his book, that the 
modern world lacks any single “controlling moral authority,” as “there are numerous voices 
claiming such authority.”93 Continuing on this topic, he writes that Quakers do not have 
hierarchies or centralized leadership. Instead, they have their history as a religious movement 
and their individual abilities of discernment, both of which they turn to as sources of guidance.94 
This lack of formalized or institutionalized authority causes the concept of “the Light Within,” 
the presence of Christ which is present within all people, to assume a high degree of 
importance.95 
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With this in mind, it makes sense when Ciancio describes Christ as a sort of moral 
anchor. At one point, he calls Christ “our guiding star throughout this discussion.”96 At another 
point, he argues that the “pacifist Christians of the first few centuries” lived in such a positive 
way because of “their historic closeness to Christ.”97 Ciancio writes that, when confronting an 
ethical dilemma, “we are obligated to consider all sides” before selecting “the highest moral 
choice,” which will ultimately be “the most Christlike choice.”98 Put another away, people 
should take personal responsibility for their actions and follow the compassionate example of 
Christ, whose life and actions constituted “a Divine Categorical Imperative.”99 
The idea of Christ as an ideal moral role model naturally ties into an idea of Christ as a 
role model for one’s character. This is all but said by Ciancio when he writes that “Jesus had the 
absolute perfect moral character and must be our role model.”100 A similarity to virtue ethics 
becomes apparent when Ciancio explains that “Jesus exemplified a truly intrinsic ethical 
disposition”: that Christ only saw actions as moral if such actions expressed the entirety of one’s 
character.101 Ciancio himself holds that “only a deeply inherent moral character” can enable such 
people as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Bishop Desmond Tutu, the freedom riders, and the 
Christians who saved Jews in Nazi Germany.102 This position confirms that Ciancio, personally, 
is oriented toward a concept of character which is internal, much as a virtue ethicist would be. 
Another major point on this topic which is expressed in Ciancio’s work is the presence of 
particularism within Quaker morality. When discussing the fifth moral stage, which he is 
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positively inclined towards due to its break from the fourth stage, he explains that it is a stage in 
which ethics become situational.103 This appears to mark his position as one which is pro-
particularistic. His book also often advocates for a care-based approach, which demonstrates his 
particularistic thinking. That point, however, will be thoroughly explored in this paper’s section 
on care ethics. 
In addition to those main points of similarity with virtue ethics, this book makes a 
somewhat smaller one concerning the virtues. Ciancio includes a brief discussion of the Quaker 
testimonies. While not binding rules, they are ideals which “provide moral structure” and cannot 
be fully abandoned.104 In this discussion, he lists four testimonies: “Peace, Integrity, Simplicity, 
and Equality.”105 The function which these testimony serve, as well as the specific values which 
these testimonies promote, may be seen as very similar to the functions of and ideals promoted 
by the virtues of virtue ethics. Later, just before describing Jesus as one who “had the absolute 
perfect moral character,” Ciancio describes Christ’s “moral behaviors and characteristics—
honesty, moral courage, constancy, and, most of all, his compassion.”106 These behaviors and 
characteristics could easily be listed as virtues. 
To summarize, Conservative Quakerism is a nearly-perfect match with virtue ethics. It 
eschews absolute rules, heavily emphasizes Christlike role modeling, places great value on 
character, and stresses particularism. Besides this, there is a moderate amount of attention given 
to the virtues. This, taken together, means that Conservative Quakerism contains five out of the 
six traits of virtue ethics as conceptually defined. 
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EVANGELICAL QUAKERS 
Evangelical Quakerism is the last branch of the religion which will be examined in this 
study. With much of its roots in revivalism, the Evangelical branch places a great deal of 
importance on expanding its numbers through conversion. The Richmond Declaration of Faith, 
produced in 1887, served and continues to serve as a common foundation for Evangelical Quaker 
communities all around the world, providing a key point of unification which exists to this 
day.107  
While the prevalent culture among Evangelical Quakers has changed with the times, 
there are many things which they have shown no intention of compromising on. Multiple 
technological and societal developments of the twentieth century have prompted Quaker 
Evangelicals to be less formal in their religious practices and more accepting of 
multiculturalism.108 Despite those shifts, they have remained staunchly opposed to premarital 
sex, substance abuse, and lying.109 
The efforts of Quaker Evangelicals have led to surprising demographic changes within 
the faith. Many of them have participated in service missions abroad, providing essential 
supporting with such things as housing.110 They have also gone abroad to convert people, finding 
tremendous success. Evangelism has made considerable gains in Alaska, Ireland, Russia, Latin 
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America, eastern Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.111 As a result, a numerical majority of 
Evangelical Quakers are now from the “Global South.”112  
Attempts have been made to bring the Evangelical branch of Quakerism closer to its 
sibling branches. These efforts enjoyed some positive results, but they have fallen short of 
success. Major contention exists between Evangelical Quakerism and Liberal Quakerism, largely 
due to the latter’s decision to move away from a belief in scripture’s infallibility.113 
The Report of Fourth Triennial Conference of Evangelical Friends Held at Denver 
Friends Church features a compilation of speeches delivered by a variety of the conference’s 
attendees. Some parts of some of these speeches support a comparison with virtue ethics. T. 
Eugene Coffin encourages Christians to emulate the compassion of Jesus in a way which could 
be construed as role modeling.114 Similarly, Simeon O. Smith asserts that outward ordinances 
serve “to demonstrate some spiritual devotion or value,” going on to say “that every act of a 
Christian should be the outward demonstration of an inward work.”115 This parallels a key 
position of virtue ethics: that outward actions are primarily significant because of what they 
indicate about one’s inner character. Despite these similarities, this document, as a whole, is 
opposed to virtue ethics. The discrepancies are, by far, more numerous and notable than the 
similarities. 
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The speeches contained within the conference report are overwhelmingly supportive of 
authority, divine commands, and rule-based ethics. Paul Todd’s speech refers to the story of 
King Asa, explaining how Asa was punished for going against the will of God and urging the 
audience to avoid suffering the same fate.116 Lloyd Hinshaw also endorses this sort of obedience, 
saying that both individuals and churches whom God is speaking to should “OBEY!”117 In a 
speech focusing on young people, Roy P. Clark argues that the gospel should be taught to the 
young “clearly, authoritatively, and intelligently.”118 He later doubles down on this position, 
calling for “an authoritarian message of the Gospel to challenge modern young people for God,” 
even is such a message must be “dogmatic.”119 
These sorts of claims and ideas show up again and again in the conference report. Harold 
B. Winn argues that, since Christ “has purchased us and assures us that He assumes our best 
interests,” Christ “has the right to expect obedience” from human beings.120 The ideas expressed 
within this document also make plain that the norm of Evangelical Quakerism is the infallibility 
of scripture. Owen W. Glassburn talks briefly about how “the MESSAGE needs no 
improvement,” concluding with a statement that “The only answer to the world’s need is the 
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gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.”121 More tellingly, the constitution featured near the end of the 
document states, in the first section of its third article, that “the Bible is the divinely inspired, 
infallible and authoritative Word of God, fully sufficient to instruct man in the way of salvation 
through Jesus Christ.”122 There is little room for ambiguity here. 
One may be confused after having read this evaluation of the Evangelical conference 
report. After all, if this document is at all representative of their branch, Evangelical Quakers 
have a heavy inclination in the direction of rule following. This may seem very odd, since one 
would expect a non-credal group to avoid such an explicit alignment behind commands, rules, 
and authority. The clarification to this puzzlement, however, may be offered by the conference 
report itself. During the conference, it is recorded that Gerald W. Dillon insisted on a core of 
foundational beliefs, without which, he claimed, there could not “be any sense of Christian 
fellowship.”123 Dillon returns to this point as he concludes his talk; he say that “this fellowship” 
must be exclusive, in the sense of excluding “those who deny any of the essential doctrines of the 
Christian faith.”124 Furthermore, the constitution included in this conference report explicitly 
specifies that it “does not in any way constitute a new statement of Friends belief, for we are in 
full accord with the historic evangelical position of our church as summarized in George Fox’s 
letter to the governor of Barbadoes [sic] and in the 1887 Richmond Declaration of Faith.”125 That 
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disclaimer inserted into the constitution has much in common with the claims laid out by Gerald 
Dillon. It would appear to point to a strong emphasis on proper doctrine as established by 
particular documents. Such a strong root in doctrine could be taken as a plausible explanation for 
how Evangelical Quakerism is so invested in authority and rule-following. 
Interestingly, the Evangelical denomination seems to be the only branch of contemporary 
Quakerism which is predominantly in opposition to virtue ethics. It does contain those traits of 
virtue ethics having to do with role modeling and character, but it is heavily differentiated from 
virtue ethics by its strong emphasis on obeying authority and following absolute rules. Such 
commands, especially when they are so heavily emphasized, carry enough weight that they more 
than cancel out the occasional points of overlap between Quaker Evangelism and virtue ethics. 
This denomination would probably bear a resemblance to or be classified as a system of 
deontology. 
 
ELEMENTS OF CARE ETHICS 
The three sources which are associated with contemporary forms of Quakerism all, to 
varying degrees, contain traits of care ethics. This is a matter of interest, given the affinity 
between care ethics and virtue ethics. Accordingly, this study will conclude by evaluating the 
elements of care ethics which are present within these sources. 
In his article on Liberal Quakers, Scully brings up an interesting point about Quakerism 
in general, and this idea is interesting enough that it ought to be applied to Conservative and 
Evangelical thinking as well. He suggests that Liberal Quakers practice care ethics, which he 
defines “as an orientation that prioritises relationality and empathy, rather than rights and 
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autonomy.”126 Some voices within academia have apparently argued that “care ethics is a 
subspecies of virtue ethics,” while others have called it “a broader concept that has a place in 
other ethical theories and approaches as well.”127 
Since Quakers appear to consider factors of relationality more than factors relating to 
justice, according to Scully, he argues that many of the virtues and values of Quakers lead them 
to take a position of care ethics. Research suggests that care ethics is practiced by “many socially 
marginalised groups,” suggesting in turn that Quakers view themselves as such a group.128 
Ciancio’s book appears to be in strong support of a care-ethics approach. When 
considering specific examples of moral dilemmas, he utilizes a particularistic outlook which 
molds itself depending on the care factors involved. He criticizes those who take absolutist 
positions on abortion, arguing that one should consider whether the pregnant woman is in danger 
of losing her life and whether that woman was made pregnant against their will. Ultimately, 
Ciancio expresses concern for both those who have an unwanted pregnancy and the fetuses 
which are under consideration for abortion. And, regardless of the circumstances under which a 
person has an abortion, he urges that others follow the example of Jesus Christ’s “loving 
compassion for sinners and outcasts.”129 When considering whether or not people should be kept 
alive if they will only be able to live in a vegetative state, Ciancio believes that people should be 
treated in the way in which they have indicated that they want to be treated. He is against 
absolute rules stating that a person should never have a feeding tube withdrawn, since such a rule 
would “offer no benefit to the patient, but may cause more discomfort and pain.”130 In both of 
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these situations, one can see that Ciancio is being empathetic and, to a large degree, trying to 
minimize harm by taking on the perspectives of those whom he is thinking about. 
A reader can also find a trend of care ethics within Ciancio’s presentation of Jesus Christ. 
When describing the traits which make Christ a perfect moral agent and an ideal role model, he 
designates “compassion” as the moral trait of Christ which is overlooked “most of all.”131 Later, 
Ciancio argues that the ability to see goodness in all people made Jesus especially admirable. 
Christ could perceive the good in a Roman centurion, “some Pharisees,” “tax gatherers, Gentiles, 
prostitutes, the sick, and sinners of all sorts.”132 This wide assortment of people included 
members of an occupying military force, Christ’s own ideological opponents, and “the outcasts 
of his society,” but this did not prevent Christ from accepting and caring for them.133 In these 
ways, Christ, as depicted by Ciancio, can be seen as a very committed care ethicist. 
The report of the Evangelical conference also contains components which could easily be 
viewed as instances of care. In one case, T. Eugene Coffin says that “compassion” describes both 
“The motive of evangelism in our Friends Churches” and the attitude of Jesus.134 Howard E. 
Kershner, too, has some things to say on this matter. He explains that punishment, a retributive 
form of justice, fails to help people and merely cements the negative behaviors of the person 
being punished. Jesus, he claims, took a different approach and decided to instead change people 
through love. This, according to Kershner, led Christ to forgive sinners who were willing to 
repent and should lead ordinary people to be forgiving towards others.135 The Evangelical branch 
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of Quakerism also appears to have invested itself in the idea of a Christ who lived according to 
the ethics of care. 
The relations of contemporary Quakerism to systems of care ethics do not necessarily 
make the moral ideas of Quakers more like or less like standard virtue ethics, as conceptually 
defined earlier. However, these considerations do provide an additional dimension through 
which this study can be viewed and may provide a suggestion for future research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research project has attempted to understand how Quakers are able to arrive at 
norms for action despite their lack of a creed. Belief has been described as the foundation of 
reasoning, something influenced by historical and cultural contexts, and a factor which 
establishes contrasts between groups of people. Though always complex and often difficult, 
belief’s key role in the experience of being human makes it a necessary concept to use when 
studying religions. Taking the Nicene Creed as paradigmatic, creeds may be defined as explicit 
statements which express beliefs relating to both matters of doctrine and matters of proper living. 
To arrive at a better understanding of how Quakers could effectively conduct themselves without 
creeds, this project proposes that many Quakers utilize an ethical approach or attitude which 
closely parallels virtue ethics. For the purposes of this project, virtue ethics was defined as an 
ethical method which has all of or most of the following traits: an aversion to making decisions 
based on authoritative rules or commands, an emphasis on inward character over outward 
actions, a belief in habit as a major factor which influences the development of character, a 
consideration of virtues as guidelines which steer a person away from vices and undesirable 
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extremes, a valuing of role modeling as a way of moral instruction, and a preference for 
particularistic moral reasoning. 
With these concepts in mind, this project studied an important guide to prayer from 
Quietist Quakerism, a scholarly report on the ethical processes of Liberal Quakers, a 
contemporary book written by a Conservative Quaker, and a report on a conference of 
Evangelical Quakers. Having examined these sources, it is apparent that the practices of the 
Quietist Quakers bore enough resemblance to virtue ethics to be notable. In the modern day, the 
thinking of Liberal Quakers and Conservative Quakers bears heavily resemblances to the 
thinking of virtue ethicists. Evangelical Quakers, however, express positions which have only a 
few commonalities with virtue ethics and many contrasts with virtue ethics. Additionally, the 
Liberal, Conservative, and Evangelical branches of contemporary Quakerism all contain 
characteristics of care ethics. 
This study hoped to shed light both on Quaker ethics specifically and religious belief in 
general. On the matter of Quaker ethics, it has shown that two of the three major branches of the 
faith which currently exist employ ethical methods which are very similar to the standards of 
virtue ethics. This strain of thought can also be seen in their Quietist forerunners. Importantly, 
this similarity with virtue ethics does not appear to be due to an explicit attempt on the part of 
Quakers to mimic that school of thought. It seems, instead, to be due to certain values, traditions, 
and historical observations which predispose Liberals and Conservatives to act in ways which 
highly resemble virtue ethics. Evangelicals, meanwhile, appear to follow deontological rules and 
commands due to the high degree to which their branch is grounded in particular documents and 
articles of belief, such as the 1887 Richmond Declaration of Faith. 
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Those conclusions about the case of Quakerism lead into some conclusions about 
religious belief in general. It would appear that creeds are not necessary to religious life. Even 
without a creed, religions can function by fashioning their ethics from their values, their 
traditions, their histories, and observations about the histories of other peoples. One might 
respond by saying that such components play a role in the ethical considerations of all groups of 
people, from families to businesses to militaries and so on. Far from a mundane and obvious 
point, this might be saying something profound. It may indicate that many religions are unique in 
their ethical reasoning because of creeds and that religions without creeds must naturally turn to 
values, traditions, and history just as nonreligious groups would. This is not to say that religious 
groups will necessarily come to the same ethical determinations as nonreligious groups but that, 
without a creed to create a firm division which sets them apart from all other persons, religious 
groups must use the same methods of coming to their determinations that everyone else does. 
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